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Why points and miles lose value over time, shown as a timeline

An invented loyalty program followed for eight years shows why points buy less: too many points, price rises, earning cuts and transfer changes, with the sums.

Points do not lose value because someone in a back office decides to be unkind. A devaluation, any change that lowers what a unit of a loyalty currency buys, comes from structure. They lose value because of a structural fact: a loyalty program hands out promises of future travel today, in unlimited quantity, and the airline or hotel can only honor those promises with a limited number of seats and rooms. When more promises are issued than the seats can absorb, something has to give. It gives through prices, availability or earning rates, and the holder is the one who feels it.

This post follows one invented program, Meridian Miles, across eight years. Meridian, its prices and its dates are made up, and I am describing a pattern rather than any real program's history. For what to do in the weeks after a specific announcement, see anatomy of a points devaluation, from first rumors to the new chart. This post is about the slower question of why the changes come, in what order and how they stack up.

Years 1 to 4: promises are issued faster than seats

Year 1: the program launches with a generous chart

Meridian Airlines starts a frequent flyer program. The airline's purpose is not generosity. It wants to bring customers back, and a promise of free travel is cheap to make while the airline has empty seats. Members earn miles on flights, and the airline publishes an award chart: a domestic roundtrip costs 25,000 miles.

At this point a domestic roundtrip has a cash fare of $400. So a mile buys $400 ÷ 25,000 = 1.6 cents of travel. cents per point is the yardstick that matters for everything else in this post: the cash value of the trip divided by the miles it costs.

Only a few members have large balances. Seats given as awards are the seats that would have flown empty, so the airline's real cost of an award is small. The program works as designed.

Year 2: the credit card arrives

In the second year Meridian signs a co-brand deal with a bank. The bank buys miles from the airline, in bulk, and awards them to cardholders for everyday spending. The airline receives cash up front for every mile sold. how airlines profit from co-brand credit cards, and what that means for you explains the economics from the airline's side.

Two things change at once, and neither looks like a problem:

  • The number of miles in circulation jumps. Most new miles come from spending on cards, not from flights.
  • The airline now has a revenue reason to sell more miles. Each mile sold is money, and the seat that eventually redeems it is a cost that arrives later and is spread across years.

An invented sense of scale: before the card, members earned 10 million miles a year, almost all from flying. After the card, members earn 30 million, two thirds of them from the bank. The seats available for awards have not tripled. The new miles are a claim on the same airplane.

The airline's side of the ledger

The year-by-year story is easier to follow once you see the airline's incentives in numbers. Here is a deliberately simple version, with invented figures.

The bank pays Meridian 1.2 cents for each mile it buys, an invented price. When a cardholder earns 25,000 miles, the airline has collected 25,000 × $0.012 = $300 in cash. It owes the member a future domestic roundtrip, but what that trip costs the airline depends on the seat:

  • A seat that would otherwise fly empty. The airline's extra cost of carrying one more passenger is small, say $40 for food, fuel and fees, an invented figure. The airline has $300 in hand and a $40 cost. The award is profitable.
  • A seat that would have sold for $400. Carrying the award passenger means giving up a $400 sale. Against $300 collected, the award costs the airline $100 in lost revenue, even though no cash leaves the building.

That contrast explains most of what members see. A program that has a rational interest in awards will release seats when the flight is likely to leave with empty seats and hold them back when it is likely to sell out. As more miles are in circulation, more members chase the empty-seat awards and the pool of those seats fills up. Availability tightens first, because it costs the airline nothing to say "no seats." Price changes come later, because they have to be announced and defended.

There is a second effect that members never see. Some miles are never redeemed at all, because the member forgets them, lets an account lapse or leaves a small balance behind. Accountants call this breakage, and a program that expects some breakage can issue more miles than it will ever pay out. The terms of each program say what happens to dormant accounts.

Year 3: prices rise and the old chart looks better

In year three, cash fares go up to $440. The award chart does not move, still 25,000 miles for a domestic roundtrip. The value per mile rises to $440 ÷ 25,000 = 1.76 cents.

This is the stage in which holders feel rich. It is also a signal. A fixed-price chart in a world of rising fares means each award costs the airline more in forgone revenue than it did two years before. The airline notices this long before members do. Keep the number in mind: 1.76 cents is the high point of the program.

At this stage a sensible holder does one thing: uses miles on trips they would take anyway. Hoarding at the peak is the common mistake, because the peak is the moment when the program has the most reason to change the rules.

Year 4: the seats get harder to find

The first change is almost invisible, and no one announces it. The lowest-priced award seats, the ones that cost the chart's 25,000 miles, begin to be released on fewer flights and fewer days. Members searching for the chart price find fewer matches. Higher-priced awards, if they exist, are still available.

Here is the logic with invented numbers. Suppose Meridian releases 1,000 chart-price award seats a month. In the early years members request 600, and every request is filled. After the card, members would request 2,000 if they could. Of the 2,000, 1,000 are filled and 1,000 are turned away, and members experience a program with fewer "good" seats.

The airline has two ways to close the gap, and both lower the value of a mile. It can make fewer seats available at the old price, or it can raise the price until requests fall back to what the seats can absorb. In this case, with demand at twice the supply, a price near twice the old one would balance them, which is about 50,000 miles. A real program rarely goes that far in one step, but the direction is clear.

Years 5 to 8: the program reprices

Year 5: the chart goes up

The airline announces a new chart. Domestic roundtrips rise from 25,000 to 30,000 miles, with a few weeks of notice. Cash fares are still $440.

  • Price increase: (30,000 − 25,000) ÷ 25,000 = 20 percent.
  • New value per mile: $440 ÷ 30,000 = 1.47 cents.
  • Purchasing power compared with year three: 1.467 ÷ 1.76 = 83 percent, a fall of about 17 percent.

The airline's press release talks about "simplicity" and "more ways to earn." Read the table, not the headline. The window between the announcement and the effective date is the time to book trips you were going to take, and should you spend points now or save them for a bigger trip? helps you decide how far to go.

Year 6: the chart is replaced by dynamic pricing

The next step is to remove the chart entirely. Under dynamic award pricing, the miles price of an award follows the cash price of the ticket. Say Meridian sets the price of a mile at 1.25 cents. A domestic roundtrip priced at $440 now costs $440 ÷ $0.0125 = 35,200 miles. When a sale fare of $240 appears, the same flight costs $240 ÷ $0.0125 = 19,200 miles.

Notice what has happened to the value of a mile. It is no longer a variable that depends on how clever you are at finding a rare chart price. It is 1.25 cents on every redemption, whatever the fare, which is a fall of 29 percent from the year three high ($1.25 ÷ $1.76 = 0.71). On cheap fares, you pay less in miles than you used to. On expensive fares, such as holidays and last-minute trips, you pay more. The "sweet spots," the redemptions that were unusually good value under the chart, are gone, and the airline has a clean way to say that every award is priced fairly.

The change is not entirely a loss. A dynamic system can offer awards on flights that were never in the old chart, and a member with small balances can often redeem for a cheap fare. But it takes away the upside that made accumulating miles attractive.

Year 7: the earning side changes

By year seven the price of an award is stable and the next lever is the earn rate. The co-brand card, which paid 1.5 miles per dollar of spending, is changed to 1.25. The airline has a reason to do this: each mile issued is a future liability, and fewer miles per dollar reduces it.

Combine the two changes to see the effect. A cardholder who spends $10,000 a year:

  • Year 3: 10,000 × 1.5 = 15,000 miles, which buys 15,000 ÷ 25,000 = 0.60 of a domestic roundtrip.
  • Year 7: 10,000 × 1.25 = 12,500 miles, which buys 12,500 ÷ 35,200 = 0.355 of a domestic roundtrip at the same $440 fare.

0.355 ÷ 0.60 = 0.59. The trips earned per dollar spent have fallen by about 41 percent. Neither change alone was that large: the earning cut was 16.7 percent and the pricing change was 29 percent. They multiply, because the holder gets fewer miles and each mile buys less.

Fares rose in the meantime, so the trip is worth more in cash than it was. That does not help the holder who wants a trip, only the one who wants a fare's worth of value, and the cash price of travel rose for everyone.

Year 8: the bank changes the transfer ratio

The last change in the timeline comes from outside the airline. Many people hold points in a bank program that transfers to airlines, not in the airline's own program. Suppose the bank's rule had been that 1,000 bank points transfer to 1,000 Meridian miles, and it changes to 1,250 bank points for 1,000 miles.

One bank point now buys 1,000 ÷ 1,250 = 0.8 of a mile, so it is worth 20 percent less when used for Meridian. Holders of the bank's points can still use them elsewhere, so the loss is partial, but it makes transfers to this partner less attractive than before. how a points transfer to an airline or hotel works, step by step covers how transfers are priced.

The whole timeline at a glance

Year What happened Miles for a domestic roundtrip Cash fare Value per mile
1 Program launches 25,000 $400 1.60 cents
3 Fares rise, chart unchanged 25,000 $440 1.76 cents
5 Chart raised 30,000 $440 1.47 cents
6 Dynamic pricing at 1.25 cents 35,200 $440 1.25 cents

Over the whole run, the value of a mile fell from the peak of 1.76 cents to 1.25 cents, a drop of about 29 percent, while the number of miles in circulation tripled and the earn rate fell. A holder who sat on 50,000 miles from year one saw their balance buy $800 of travel (50,000 × 1.6 cents) in year one and $625 (50,000 × 1.25 cents) after dynamic pricing, a loss of 21.9 percent. Nothing in the account changed. The balance was the same 50,000 miles.

Why the pattern repeats

The program in this post is invented, but the structure is general. A loyalty currency is a promise the issuer controls. The issuer sells it, sometimes in very large volume, and the cost of honoring it arrives later. That timing gives the issuer a reason to make the promise easier to issue than to redeem. Programs differ widely in how fast and how far they move, and some hold prices steady for years. Valuations also differ by publisher, which is why published cents-per-point estimates should be read as one analyst's opinion, not a guaranteed figure.

Some programs have moved from published charts to prices that follow the cash fare. Some have changed earning rules. Others have made changes to transfer partners. A specific program's terms and notice rules are in its member agreement, and each one has the right to change them.

What the timeline does not say

A timeline like this can make every program sound doomed, and that is not the right conclusion. A few caveats:

  • Not every program moves the same way or at the same speed. Some hold their prices for long stretches, and some changes help members, such as new partners, new routes or a cheaper award for a particular trip.
  • Hotel and bank programs follow their own logic. A hotel can price nights by category, and a bank program can change the value of a point for a type of redemption without touching its transfer partners. The mechanics differ, even though the incentive to keep the promise cheap is similar.
  • Panic is a poor strategy. Spending a large balance on something you do not want, just to use it before a rumor comes true, is a way of paying a price now to avoid a loss that may not arrive. If you have no trip, the balance is still worth what the next redemption is worth.
  • Valuations are a moving target. A cents-per-point figure you see in a guide is dated, and a program can change what it means without changing its name.

What a holder can do

  1. Treat points as an asset that tends to lose value, not one that gains. A balance you plan to use in the next year or two is less exposed than one you are saving for an unspecified future trip.
  2. Keep a record of what redemptions cost. Write down the price in points and the cash price today. When a change comes you will know how big it was, and the points and miles value calculator will compare before and after.
  3. Do not hoard without a plan. A modest balance used on a trip you want is worth more than a large balance used on nothing. mistakes that quietly shrink the value of your points lists other ways value leaks.
  4. Watch the earning side as well as the price. An earning cut can cost more over a year than a one-time price increase.
  5. Know the expiry and inactivity terms. Some programs expire points after a period without activity, and Do points and miles expire? How inactivity rules work covers the questions to ask.
  6. Compare with plain cash back now and then. If a program's value per point has fallen below what a flat cash back card would have returned, the premium for the points is gone.

Key takeaways

  • Points lose value because a program can issue promises faster than it can supply seats. The adjustment shows up as higher prices, fewer cheap seats, lower earning rates or worse transfer ratios.
  • In the invented program, one mile fell from 1.76 cents at its peak to 1.25 cents, a 29 percent drop, with no change to the member's balance.
  • Cuts compound. A 16.7 percent earning cut and a 29 percent price rise together reduced trips earned per dollar by about 41 percent.
  • The warning signs come before the announcement: fewer low-price seats, a surge in miles issued through card deals and changes to how awards are priced.
  • A balance you plan to use is better protected than one you hoard. Record redemption prices now, so a future change can be measured.

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