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The Credit Card Competition Act: what it would change and what each side says

The bill would let merchants route card payments over a network besides Visa or Mastercard. Its mechanics, each side's case and its not-passed status in 2026.

The Credit Card Competition Act is a proposed federal law, not a law in force. As its sponsors describe it, it would require the largest card issuers to let merchants route credit card transactions over at least one network other than Visa or Mastercard, so that networks would compete for the merchant's business and swipe fees could fall. As of August 2026, the latest coverage found for this article, it had not passed either chamber of Congress. If you are asking what it does to your card today, the answer is nothing.

This post compares the system as it works now with the system the bill describes, sets out the case each side makes, and shows with labeled arithmetic where the money could and could not move. It is a debate guide. Nothing here predicts whether the bill passes.

Where it stands, with dates

The Senate bill in the 2026 session is S. 3623, introduced January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Banking Committee. Its Senate sponsors are Roger Marshall, a Republican from Kansas, and Dick Durbin, a Democrat from Illinois. The House companion is H.R. 7035, led by Rep. Lance Gooden. According to trade-press coverage, President Trump publicly backed the bill in January 2026.

What happened next, in order:

  1. The Senate passed the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act on March 13, 2026 without a Credit Card Competition Act amendment, which had been one hoped-for route to a vote.
  2. In August 2026, three more senators were reported to have cosponsored the bill.
  3. Senate Majority Leader Thune said there would be no cloture vote before the August recess. Cloture is the Senate procedure that ends debate so a vote can be taken.
  4. No vote after that could be found, and the bill had not passed either chamber as of the latest coverage located. Anything later than August 2026 was not verified.

Bills that reach this stage can sit for a long time, move as part of a larger package or lapse at the end of a Congress. How a bill differs from a regulation is in how a proposed card rule becomes law, and how to follow or comment on one. You can follow this one by searching its number on congress.gov.

How a card payment is routed today

To see what the bill changes, start with how the pieces fit. When you tap a credit card, four parties are involved besides you:

  • The merchant, who wants to be paid.
  • The merchant's bank and processor (the acquirer), who send the transaction on and charge the merchant a fee.
  • The card network, such as Visa or Mastercard, which carries the message and sets rules and a schedule of interchange fees.
  • The issuer, the bank that gave you the card, which approves the purchase and receives the interchange fee.

The fee a merchant pays, often called the merchant discount rate, bundles the interchange fee that goes to the issuer, network fees and the processor's markup. The post one $100 sale: how interchange, network fees and the merchant's cut split follows a single $100 sale through those layers.

For credit cards, the issuer chooses which network its card runs on, and the merchant generally has no say about which network carries a given card's transaction. A Visa-branded credit card goes over Visa. This is the point the bill targets: today the merchant can decline to accept a brand, but the network rules, including the honor all cards rule that a merchant accepting the brand's cards has to take all of that brand's credit cards, limit how it can respond to high fees. The November 2025 settlement described in The Visa and Mastercard swipe-fee settlement: questions about what changes loosens that rule, as reported, but it is a separate matter from this bill.

What the bill would change, in plain terms

The text and the exact thresholds were not re-read for this article, so this description follows the sponsors' summary and should be checked against the bill on congress.gov. Per the sponsors, the bill would:

  • Apply to the largest card issuers rather than to every bank or credit union. The asset threshold that defines "largest" is a detail to check in the bill text.
  • Require those issuers to enable at least two networks on their credit cards, at least one of which is not Visa or Mastercard.
  • Let the merchant choose which of the enabled networks carries a given transaction.

A similar routing requirement has existed since 2010 for debit cards of large banks, under the amendment Durbin attached to the Dodd-Frank Act. The Credit Card Competition Act is often described as extending that idea to credit. It is not a cap on rates or fees. It does not set an interchange fee, and it does not tell issuers what to charge you.

What would likely not change: the card in your wallet, your APR, your payment due date or your fraud protections. Those come from your issuer and from federal rules, not from routing.

The sponsors' case

Supporters, who include many merchant groups, argue that card networks face limited competition on the credit side and that routing choice would pressure interchange fees lower. Their reasoning in outline:

  • Interchange fees are set by the network and imposed on merchants who cannot negotiate them.
  • Merchants that accept cards cannot realistically refuse the largest networks.
  • If a second network is enabled and the merchant can pick it, networks would have to compete on price.
  • Savings would reach consumers through lower prices, and merchants would put money into wages or investment.

The reported terms of the Visa and Mastercard settlement (an average swipe fee cited as 2.36 percent) are often used as context for why supporters say the fees are high. Whether the savings would reach shoppers in prices is the subject of swipe fee claims tested: do they raise prices, fund rewards, or both?.

The opponents' case

Banks, card networks and their trade groups have opposed the bill. Their arguments, in outline:

  • Rewards. Interchange helps fund cash back and points. If it falls, issuers may reduce rewards, raise annual fees or tighten approval. Supporters reply that the evidence from the debit experience is contested and that issuers have other revenue.
  • Security and fraud. Networks invest in fraud prevention and tokenization, and opponents argue that routing over lesser-funded networks could weaken protections. Supporters respond that the bill does not remove security requirements.
  • Smaller issuers. Critics worry that routing would push business toward networks that smaller issuers have less leverage with, even if the bill targets large issuers.
  • Merchant pass-through. Opponents argue that merchants would keep the savings rather than lower prices.

Both sets of claims are predictions. Each depends on how issuers and merchants behave after a law took effect, which is why careful writers separate what a bill says from what its supporters or opponents expect.

A side-by-side table

Question System today System the bill describes
Who chooses the network for a credit transaction? The issuer, by what network its card runs on The merchant, among networks the issuer must enable
Who sets interchange? The network's published schedule Each network, competing for routing
Does it cap interchange? No No
Whose cards are affected? All Visa and Mastercard credit cards The largest issuers' credit cards, per the sponsors
What changes for the cardholder directly? Nothing Nothing directly
Where is the debate? Whether fees are too high Whether routing would lower them, and who would benefit

Worked example: where the money could move

These numbers are labeled hypotheticals, not market rates or predictions.

Say a merchant takes $1,000,000 a month in credit card sales. Each 0.1 percentage point of fee on that volume is $1,000 a month ($1,000,000 x 0.001). If routing competition cut the effective fee by 0.3 percentage points, the merchant would save $3,000 a month, or $36,000 a year.

Now follow the same 0.3 points to a rewards cardholder. Suppose that on $1,000 of monthly spending, the issuer's interchange revenue fell by 0.3 percentage points, or $3. A card paying 1.5 percent cash back ($15 on $1,000) funded by, in the illustration, a 2 percent fee ($20) would see its margin on that spending change from $5 to $2 before other costs. The issuer could absorb that, cut the rewards, or raise a different charge. What it would actually do is unknown.

Two honest conclusions come out of the arithmetic. First, the amounts are large in aggregate and small per transaction, which is why both sides can say the stakes are real. Second, neither the merchant's saving nor the issuer's loss is guaranteed, because both depend on whether competition actually lowers fees. For the cardholder, the practical effect would show up only in rewards or prices, and only if the market moved. A related look at how cash back is funded is in where cash back comes from, and why it is never really free money.

Three people, one bill

A bill like this lands differently depending on where you stand. Here are three labeled hypotheticals, with round numbers chosen for the arithmetic.

Priya pays in full and uses a flat 1.5 percent cash-back card. She never pays interest, so her card is, from the issuer's side, funded mainly by the interchange on her spending. If the bill lowered interchange and an issuer responded by trimming her rate from 1.5 to 1.25 percent, on $20,000 of annual spending her cash back would fall from $300 to $250, a $50 difference. If the issuer did not respond, she would see no change. She would not see a lower price on groceries unless merchants passed savings through.

Tom carries a balance on a card with no rewards. His issuer earns interest from him as well as interchange from merchants. The bill would not change his APR or his payment due date. Any effect would be indirect, for example through the issuer's decisions about annual fees or credit lines if its revenue fell. Whether that would happen is a prediction.

Elena runs a small restaurant with $40,000 a month in credit card sales. Each 0.1 percentage point of fee on that volume is $40 a month. If competition between networks lowered her effective fee by 0.3 points, she would save $120 a month, or $1,440 a year. Whether her prices fall, her staff are paid more or her margin improves is her decision, which is the pass-through question opponents raise.

The three households show why the argument is hard to settle with a headline. The same dollar is a merchant's cost, an issuer's revenue and, in part, a cardholder's reward.

What merchants can already do about fees

The bill is one proposal among several levers, and merchants already have a few. Surcharging, adding a fee for paying by credit card, is allowed in many places but limited by network rules and by state law. Visa's merchant surcharge cap fell from 4 percent to 3 percent effective April 15, 2023, and Mastercard's was reported at 4 percent, with sources conflicting. Both caps are limited to the merchant's actual cost of acceptance and exclude debit and prepaid cards. Some states ban or restrict surcharging, with Connecticut and Massachusetts the clearest examples in the sources reviewed, and cash discounts are generally allowed everywhere. Surcharge details change and vary by state, so a merchant should check the network rules and the state attorney general.

The settlement described earlier would give merchants more surcharging options, as reported, and more freedom to decide which types of cards to accept. A bill that changes routing and a settlement that changes acceptance and surcharging work on different parts of the same system, so a merchant's real costs depend on all of them together.

The debit precedent and what it does and does not show

Supporters and opponents both point to debit cards. In 2010 Congress passed the amendment named for Senator Durbin as part of the Dodd-Frank Act. It regulates debit interchange for large issuers and requires that debit transactions can be routed over at least two unaffiliated networks. Debit is a different product from credit: it draws on a bank account, carries different fraud costs and has different rewards economics, so a lesson from debit does not transfer cleanly. Supporters cite it as proof that routing choice and fee limits are workable. Opponents cite changes in debit rewards and account fees after 2010 as evidence of side effects. Both readings are arguments about causation, and a careful reader should treat each as one side's interpretation rather than a settled finding.

What it is not

  • It is not a rate cap. A separate set of proposals, including a 10 percent rate-cap idea, concerns what issuers can charge cardholders. Those were proposed, not enacted, as of mid-2026.
  • It is not the Visa and Mastercard settlement. That is a court case about merchant acceptance rules and fee levels. The bill is an act of Congress.
  • It is not the Illinois law on interchange fees and sales tax. That is a state statute with its own court fight, covered in The Illinois swipe-fee law and its court fight, in the order things happened.
  • It is not already passed, even though some headlines treat it as inevitable. Treat claims of a coming change in your rewards as speculation.

How to read a headline about this bill

  1. Look for the bill number and the date. S. 3623 and H.R. 7035 are the 2026 versions; earlier sessions had different numbers.
  2. Check the status: introduced, in committee, passed one chamber, passed both, signed. As of August 2026 it had been introduced and referred to committee.
  3. Ask who is quoted. Merchant groups and bank groups both have strong interests.
  4. Separate what the bill does from what someone predicts it will do.
  5. Look for the date on any claim about rewards. A claim that cards will lose rewards "when the bill passes" is conditional on something that had not happened.

If a rewards change affects you, the facts will be in a notice from your issuer, which federal rules require to be sent at least 45 days before a significant change takes effect, with a right to reject some changes. Until a notice like that arrives, a claim that your rewards will change because of this bill is speculation.

Key takeaways

  • The Credit Card Competition Act is a proposal. S. 3623 (introduced January 13, 2026, in the Senate Banking Committee) and H.R. 7035 had not passed either chamber as of August 2026, the latest coverage found.
  • As described by its sponsors, it would require the largest issuers to let merchants route credit transactions over at least one network other than Visa or Mastercard. It does not cap interchange or card rates.
  • Supporters say competition would lower swipe fees; opponents say lower fees would put pressure on rewards, raise security concerns and not reach consumers. Both are predictions.
  • A cardholder would feel any effect only through rewards, fees or prices, not through routing itself. Do not change how you use your cards because of a headline about a bill that has not passed.

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